Flawed Road map

Pakistan’s national poet Muhammed Iqbal once described Afghanistan as the ‘heart of Asia’. Interestingly this is the name adopted for a new diplomatic initiative that is ambitious in its sweep but confused in its emphasis and flawed in its approach and sequencing. Led by Afghanistan and Turkey the plan is being driven by the US and its key Nato allies who want to unveil this at a regional conference in Istanbul on November 2.

This is the first in a series of conferences planned on Afghanistan leading to the ‘transition’ in 2014 when security responsibilities will be transferred to the Afghan authorities by Nato forces and their combat role ended. Istanbul will be followed on December 5 by the ‘Bonn+10’ international conference, co-chaired by Afghanistan and Germany. After that a Nato Summit (plus G8 countries) will convene in Chicago in May 2012.

Although these conferences have different aims they all intend to provide a framework of international support and cooperation for Afghanistan’s stabilisation during and after the transition as the withdrawal of foreign forces gathers pace.

Sequentially the first two conferences should have followed and not preceded the achievement of significant progress in the Afghan reconciliation talks aimed at a political settlement to end the war. Regional and international conferences could then have endorsed a peace deal with the Taliban and their nominees invited to the Bonn summit as ‘peace partners’.

The lack of alignment between these ‘milestone’ conferences, a yet to take off peace process and the 2014 transition timeline is more than evident. But rather than square this circle a flawed roadmap is about to be rolled out. The Istanbul conference certainly seems to put the cart before the horse.

Apart from this muddled sequencing the Istanbul conference’s focus has become so broad that it is now expected to be as much about the region as about Afghanistan. An amended draft declaration circulated ahead of this at a September 30 preparatory meeting in Oslo indicates an intention to establish a regional structure for the ‘geographical area broadly surrounding Afghanistan.’ This is being called a security and cooperation initiative for the heart of Asia.

Instead of enunciating general principles of cooperation for regional states to affirm – as the January 2010 statement did at last year’s Istanbul summit– the planned declaration seeks a new regional architecture comprising fourteen states from “South Asia, Central Asia, Euro-Asia and the Middle East”, with the US and other so-called ‘AfPak’ countries being cast as supporters of this initiative. Significantly for Islamabad, India is included in this group.

How these countries have been selected and who has selected them is not explained. It is also presumed that states comprising a ‘region’ beyond Afghanistan’s immediate neighborhood will all be willing to sign up to a regional arrangement which will establish a ‘Senior Officials Group’ to oversee a set of ‘confidence-building measures’ and agree on a monitoring and enforcement mechanism. The latter provision is designed to accommodate Kabul’s desire for a ‘binding’ agreement. But many countries including Pakistan will have reservations on this.

The fact that most countries to be drawn into this framework also happen to be members of other overlapping regional organisations – Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, ECO, OIC, SAARC and CICA – raises unanswered questions about the rationale for this duplication.

The objectives set for the Istanbul conference are two-fold – relating to Afghanistan and the region. If the broader aim is to be pursued this should really be done separately and not be mixed up in a single initiative. The measures needed to establish peace and stability in Afghanistan are very specific to the country and need to be decisively addressed internally. This means resolving the insurgency by an inclusive reconciliation process, establishing effective governance, assuring ethnic balance in the political dispensation and security institutions, eliminating corruption and addressing development needs.

Afghanistan’s stabilisation rests on dealing with these issues but this is diluted by the broader approach embodied in the Istanbul plan. The Istanbul document presumes that the internal requirements for stability can be addressed ‘externally’ through a regional initiative. The underlying presumption that all of Afghanistan’s problems are external and have to be addressed by outside powers is grievously mistaken.

The international consensus that has crystallised is that peace in Afghanistan has to be achieved through a negotiated settlement. This makes ‘reconciliation’ the commonly accepted premise for the transition process to move meaningfully forward. Washington acknowledges this. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton first expressed support for this in her speech of February 18, 2011. The US has reaffirmed this most significantly by consultations in the trilateral ‘core group’ (Afghanistan, Pakistan and the US) aimed at advancing the ‘reconciliation’ process.

If this premise is accepted then logically it should have produced a three stage process intended to culminate in the 2014 ‘transition’: i) Progress on reconciliation and an internal roadmap for effective governance to win the confidence of the Afghan people ii) Endorsement by Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours of the outcome of this peace process and commitment to Afghanistan’s independence and sovereignty and iii) Ratification and support by a broader group of countries for the principles and agreement evolved by the first two processes.

The approach taken by the Istanbul conference starts the process from the wrong end. It skips the first two necessary building blocks on the road to peace and concerns itself with what should be the third and final phases. By doing this and bringing in so many additional parties it risks complicating and jeopardising the core issue of Afghan stabilisation. In trying to artificially graft a regional structure on to the Afghan stabilisation process it can end up injecting equations that make the process more difficult.

Meanwhile US-sponsored plans are underway to mobilise support for a regional ‘Contact Group’ of countries to consult on Afghanistan’s security. It is unclear whether this idea will be floated at Istanbul or separately. This will raise new problems. Uneasy bilateral dynamics between countries expected to be part of the group will likely spill over and stymie the group’s effectiveness.

Like the proposed ‘officials group’ this can also end up retarding progress on securing the strategic objective: a political solution to pave the way for an orderly pullout of foreign forces from Afghanistan.

Meanwhile the principles set out in the draft Istanbul declaration for regional security cooperation are selective and partial. Missing are key UN charter principles of the right of self-determination, illegality of foreign occupation, non-admissibility of acquisition of territory by the use of force, and respect for the political independence of states.

Not surprisingly the issue of foreign forces in Afghanistan, which will be integral in the peace process, finds no mention in the document. There is of course a reference to 2014 in the context of the declaration’s support for the transition process. This is accompanied by an ambiguous formulation that says, “transition doesn’t mean exit from Afghanistan”. It is unclear from this whether countries are expected to implicitly endorse the presence of foreign forces beyond 2014.

The return of Afghan refugees is not mentioned anywhere in the document even though it is a critical issue for Pakistan and Iran. It is surprising to find this in a draft that has emanated from Turkey, a close friend of Pakistan. But a more significant reflection of the disregard shown for Islamabad’s interests is the effort to confer an enhanced role to India in Afghanistan and equating the role of neighbours with that of ‘near neighbours’.

An opportunity to review the Istanbul declaration will come later this month at another preparatory meeting, in Kabul. This should be utilised to address its flaws and safeguard Pakistan’s interests.

The value of the Istanbul conference lies not in trying to do too much in potentially contentious areas but in affirming practical principles to promote Afghanistan’s stability, support a development agenda as well as the ‘New Silk Road’ vision for economic collaboration. Endorsing the 2002 Kabul declaration on Good-Neighbourly Relations can also be a useful effort by the conference to build regional confidence.